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Since 1996, the Bank of England’s Centre for Central Banking Studies
(CCBS) has published a series of Handbooks in Central Banking. These
books present particular topics that concern central bankers in a concise,
balanced and practical manner.
As financial markets have become increasingly complex, central bankers'
demands for specialised technical assistance and training has risen. This has
been reflected in the content of lectures and presentations given by CCBS and
Bank staff on technical assistance and training courses. In order to give wider
distribution to the material developed in these lectures, we have introduced
this new series of Handbooks: Lecture Series.
The aim of this new series is to give wider exposure to lectures and
presentations that address topical and technically advanced issues of
relevance to central banks. The intention is both to spread ideas and
knowledge and to add to the debate in the particular subject. As always, we
welcome any comments on this Handbook. The views expressed in the
Handbook: Lecture Series are those of the author and not necessarily those of
the Bank of England.
Robert Heath
Series EditorAbstract
‘Macroprudential surveillance’ - monitoring conjunctural and structural trends
in financial markets so as to give warning of the approach of financial
instability - is immensely important, given that financial crises can have huge
costs. In this context, this paper presents three complementary lectures, which
set out in generic terms the financial data needed for monitoring risks of
financial instability. The paper starts with a view of the nature of financial
instability, and the types of turbulence, that might pose particular systemic
dangers, and the implications they have for data needs. These together give
building-blocks for the listing in the third lecture of the types of financial and
macroeconomic data that are needed for macroprudential analysis, and a
suggested approach to their interpretation. A practical example is given, by
looking at how theory and data respectively gave clues to the approach of the
Asian crisis of 1997-8, and in this context, notes the data actually available
for Thailand at the onset of the crisis in 1997.
Overall, it is suggested that the theory of financial instability and the
experience of financial crises in the past provide sufficient material to enable
meaningful use to be made of financial and macroeconomic data in
macroprudential surveillance. Such data may include econometric forecasts,
as well as current information. In using such data, judgement is crucial in
assessing risks to financial stability - macroprudential surveillance can never
be mechanistic. Nevertheless, the paper maintains that detailed knowledge of
the sequence of events in past crises, both directly and as encapsulated in
theory, is a sine qua non to interpreting the data. In addition, there is a need
for development of broad information on what constitutes normal conditions
in an economy, as well as the patterns that have often preceded financial
crises in the past both domestically and internationally.
Given the shortcomings in the data available for many countries, especially in
the emerging markets, considerable efforts to improve coverage and
timeliness are warranted. Besides macroeconomic data, emerging-market
countries may need to lay particular emphasis on better banking data, given
the structure of their financial markets, which is typically bank-dominated.
Private sector agents also have a role to play in monitoring the risks they face
as a consequence of the behaviour of the overall financial system. They are,
therefore, encouraged to undertake their own analyses of risks at a macro
level.1
FINANCIAL DATA NEEDS FOR MACROPRUDENTIAL
SURVEILLANCE – WHAT ARE THE KEY INDICATORS OF RISKS TO
DOMESTIC FINANCIAL STABILITY?1
Introduction
This paper presents three complementary lectures, which set out in generic terms
the financial data needed for monitoring risks of financial instability. We define
financial instability (also referred to as ‘financial disorder’ or ‘systemic risk’) as a
sequence of events entailing heightened risk of a financial crisis, where a financial
crisis is seen in turn as ‘a major and contagious collapse of the financial system,
entailing inability to provide payments services or to allocate funds for
investment’.2 Note that instability of institutions and markets tends to be a
necessary but not sufficient condition for a financial crisis in this sense.
‘Macroprudential surveillance’ -  monitoring of conjunctural and structural trends
in financial markets so as to give warning of the approach of financial instability -
is immensely important given that financial crises can have huge costs. For all
estimates of the potential costs of financial crises suggest that they are huge and
broadly distributed across the economy. The IMF (1998a) suggested that on
average banking crises impose costs of 14-15% of GDP; this rises to 17-19% if
they are combined with currency crises. Recovery typically takes 3-5 years. The
cost of restructuring banking sectors alone was as much as 10% of GDP in
Scandinavia, and  more than 30% of GDP after crises in some emerging markets
such as Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Kuwait.  It goes without saying that the
                    
1  This lecture was delivered by E Philip Davis to the CCBS Academic Workshop Financial
Market Data for International Financial Stability on 15 January 1999.  E Philip Davis is Senior
International Financial Advisor, Financial Intermediaries Division, Bank of England.  He is also
an Associate Member of the Financial Markets Group at LSE, Associate Fellow of the Royal
Institute of International Affairs and Research Fellow of the Pensions Institute at Birkbeck
College, London.  Please address any questions, comments or suggestions to the author at the
Bank or by e-mail to ‘e_philip_davis@msn.com’.  Views expressed are those of the author and
not necessarily those of the Bank or the other institutions to which he is affiliated. He thanks X
Freixas, M Fry, A Haldane, R Heath, G Hoggarth, C P Mann, A Milne, D Pain and P Turnbull,
as well as participants in seminars at the CCBS and the Bank of England, for helpful suggestions
and advice. The article draws on Davis (1995a).
2  An issue arises as to whether the definition should include the mispricing of financial assets.
We suggest that though this may accompany a financial crisis, the failure of payments services
and of allocation of funds are the defining features. Arguably, mispricing of financial assets is
quite common (eg in asset bubbles, exchange rate misalignments and mispricing of credit risk)
without entailing a financial crisis, or even systemic risk, whereas failure of payments and of
credit allocation are only seen in a crisis. Mispricing may nonetheless, we suggest later, be part
of the overall pattern that builds towards a crisis.2
crises also entailed widespread insolvencies in the financial sector and associated
job losses up to the highest level in affected financial institutions.  There is hence
an immense premium on timely warnings regarding systemic risks as an input to
policy decisions as well as to strategies and market behaviour of financial
institutions.
To ensure a firm basis for the analysis, with a coherent and economical choice of
data, we consider that it is important to build up to the full list of data in a series of
steps.  So, we start with a view of the nature of financial instability, and the types
of turbulence, that might pose particular systemic dangers, and the implications
they have for data needs. We then selectively combine these suggestions and make
a list of data needs and methods to analyse such data. Accordingly, the first lecture
provides an overview of the main theories of financial instability that have been
proposed in the literature, and lists the financial and macroeconomic indicators that
they highlight. The second lecture  outlines the main types of systemic financial
instability that have been observed, drawing mainly on experience of OECD
countries, and the stylised indicators that they suggest to be important. We also
assess some of the recent empirical work on banking crises and the data used to
predict such events econometrically.
These together give building-blocks for the listing in the third lecture of the types
of financial and macroeconomic data that are needed for macroprudential analysis,
and a suggested approach to their interpretation. The chosen data-set is basically a
combination of the data highlighted by theory and experience in the first two
lectures.  The chosen data-set draws on the full range of data likely to be available
in an advanced OECD economy, which other countries are urged also to provide.
In the final section of this lecture we give a practical example, by looking at how
theory and data respectively gave clues to the approach of the Asian crisis of 1997-
8. In this context, using the example of Thailand, we note the subset of our "ideal
data-set" likely to be currently available even for emerging market economies for
the purposes of macroprudential surveillance.
Throughout, it is emphasised that judgment is crucial in assessing of risks to
financial stability, and that macroprudential surveillance can never be mechanistic.
At most, crises resemble each other in terms of broad-brush features that tend to
accompany one another and follow recognisable temporal patterns. Nevertheless,
we maintain that detailed knowledge of the sequence of events in past crises, both
directly and as encapsulated in theory, is a sine qua non to interpreting the data.  It
is also emphasised that although this paper is principally directed to public
authorities, as background for the conduct of the supervisory policy and monetary
policy, private sector agents also have a role to play in monitoring the risks they3
face as a consequence of the behaviour of the overall financial system. They are,
therefore, encouraged to undertake their own analyses of risks at a macro level.
LECTURE 1: THEORIES OF FINANCIAL INSTABILITY AND RELATED
INDICATOR VARIABLES
1.1Theories of financial instability
We start by outlining the various theories of financial instability that have been
proposed in the economic literature, before considering what data they highlight. A
detailed comparative summary of the theories is provided in Davis (1995a). We
emphasise at the outset that we consider that all of the strands of theory presented
here have a contribution to make to our understanding of financial crises, but that
the explanations are in most cases partial. In our view, it is best to adopt a selective
synthesis of the theories, drawing also on the evidence of actual crises set out in
the second lecture.  We maintain this approach in our listing of data in Lecture
Three, which draws on both theory and experience.
Theories emphasising debt and financial fragility (commonly associated with
Fisher (1933), Kindleberger (1978) and Minsky (1977)) consider financial crises to
be a key feature of the turning-point of many business cycles, a response to
previous "excesses" of borrowing that can occur in a variety of financial markets.
Their work is based largely on observations of periods of financial instability up to
and including the Great Depression. These theories first pinpoint the concept of a
so-called displacement - an exogenous event leading to improved opportunities for
profitable investment - which triggers the cyclical upturn. Second,  they highlight
financial innovations (eg new forms of bank liability), which boost the supply of
credit and/or the velocity of circulation of money, and enable supply and demand
for finance to remain in balance during the fixed investment boom that follows the
displacement. However, sharp increases in demand for credit mean that interest
rates eventually rise, which leads to  “financial fragility”.
Features of fragility include an increase in debt finance, a shift from long to short-
term debt; a shift from borrowing that cash flow adequately covers to borrowing
that it does not cover at all; a heightening of speculative activity in asset markets;
and a reduction in margins of safety for financial institutions. Further rises in
interest rates, perhaps due to policy tightening, can lead to systemic risk and
financial crises, with contagious bank runs and resulting inability to provide
payments or allocate credit.  The fact that financial crises are seen as a common
feature of the business cycle may be seen as indicating ex-ante mispricing of risk
in relation to normal – and broadly predictable - cyclical developments. This is a4
controversial feature of this strand of theory. In addition, some advocates of this
approach adopt a perhaps excessively broad definition of financial crises, including
sharp changes in asset prices with no adverse systemic consequences.
The monetarist approach (linked to Friedman and Schwarz (1963)) emphasises
contagious banking panics, which may cause monetary contraction. Banking
panics arise from a public loss of confidence in banks’ abilities to convert deposits
into currency. This may be caused by failure of an important institution, which
may in turn stem from failure of the authorities to pursue a steady and predictable
monetary policy (for example accommodating inflation then tightening policy
sharply; or abandoning a currency peg). “Regime-shift” policy changes are held to
be inherently unpredictable, and so a crisis is consistent with accurate ex-ante risk
pricing. On the other hand, adherents of this approach often adopt an excessively
narrow view of a financial crisis, limiting it to the systemic consequences of a fall
in the money supply only.
Bank runs themselves (Diamond and Dybvig (1983)), which are important in both
the financial-fragility and monetarist paradigms, may be seen in terms of the
“liquidity insurance” banks provide to depositors by pooling risk; banks' assets are
mainly long-term and illiquid, and so banks engage in maturity transformation.
This feature gives an incentive for panic runs on banks even if solvent, because of
imperfect information regarding the bank's assets, inability of the bank to sell or
cash illiquid assets (ie loans) at par, and the "first come first served" process by
which claims are met. According to the original model, the risk that other
depositors may withdraw can cause a panic regardless of the underlying financial
position of the bank, and may effect both other banks (via contagion) and
borrowers without access to other sources of funds. However, Gorton (1988)
provides data suggesting that systemic panics are not random events, but are linked
to changing perceptions of the riskiness of banks by depositors at the onset of
recessions. Runs and panics may of course be counteracted by lender of last resort
or deposit insurance,3 at a cost in terms of moral hazard (see Section 1.2). The
theory also applies to liquidity failure in securities markets, where “one-way”
selling due to pervasive uncertainty, or asymmetric information between market
makers and investors, may lead market liquidity to collapse (Davis 1994, 1999).
Parallel to the assumptions of the monetarist approach about shifts in policy
regime, other theories of crisis focus on uncertainty (Shafer (1986)). Following
Knight (1921), uncertainty is defined as pertaining to future developments that
                    
3 Note that the lender of last resort is intended to deal with liquidity problems at solvent
institutions, whereas deposit insurance can deal with insolvency issues.5
cannot be reduced to objective probabilities (eg financial crises), and also
providing opportunities for profit in competitive markets. It thus contrasts with
risk, which refers to events for which in principle probability analysis can be
employed. Behaviour of markets for new financial instruments, which have not yet
been present in adverse market conditions, may be particularly subject to
uncertainty in this sense. Responses to uncertainty, for example by lending officers
in banks, may be to apply subjective probabilities to uncertain events – (such as the
occurrence of a policy regime shift or financial crisis) - and add a risk premium.
But agents often tend to judge such probabilities by the actions of others
(‘herding’4), which can collectively lead to systemic financial instability. (One
feature of herding is that individually low-risk strategies may collectively raise
system fragility.) In the presence of uncertainty, adverse surprises may trigger
shifts in confidence, affecting markets more than seems warranted by their intrinsic
significance; and so lead to a crisis. Confidence and uncertainty effects may also
trigger falls in consumption and investment relative to income that broaden the
effects of the crisis on the macroeconomy.5
Paradigms of credit rationing (Guttentag and Herring (1984)) suggest that financial
crises are characterised by abrupt increases in credit rationing. Extending the
theories stressing uncertainty outlined above, a further distinction is made between
systematic market risks, such as recession and financial crises, - which are subject
to much greater uncertainty, as outlined above. In the case of recession, it is
suggested that ex ante risk-pricing is generally accurate as such events occur
frequently and are generally well understood. But for financial crises and other
uncertain events, there is no such presumption; competition may drive prudent
creditors from the market, as they are undercut by those disregarding the likelihood
of financial crisis, because of ignorance or hope of competitive advantage.
In addition to competition, various psychological factors underlying this pattern of
’disaster myopia’6 may be identified, notably a tendency to calculate probabilities
by how easily past occurrences are brought to mind, which declines with time, as
well as institutional factors such as short periods over which loan officers are
assessed, and asymmetry of outcomes for managers and shareholders. These
tendencies, which imply declining expectations of financial crises during periods
of calm, may lead to declining capital positions, loosening of “equilibrium" price
                    
4 ‘Herding’ may be defined as willingness of financial institutions to imitate each others’
portfolios and pricing strategies, even if this is contrary to long-run profit maximisation.
5  See Davis (1995b)
6  'Disaster myopia' may be defined as a tendency to disregard uncertain, low-probability, high-
risk hazards.6
and quantity rationing of credit, and hence increased vulnerability of creditors to
shocks, since the actual probability distribution of shocks has not changed.
Expectations and reality may thus drift apart during a period of calm, until a
financial shock leads to an abrupt increase in credit rationing, as lenders become
aware of their imprudence, triggering a crisis.
Asymmetric information and agency cost theory (Mishkin (1991)) suggests that the
well-known problems of the debt contract, namely moral hazard and adverse
selection arising from information asymmetry between borrower and lender, and
absence of complete contracts, can also account for sharp contractions of credit and
financial instability. For example, if interest rates rise, there may be a sharp
increase in adverse selection (only the worse-quality borrowers are still willing to
borrow), thus leading to a decline in the supply of credit. Higher uncertainty (so
that screening of borrowers by lenders is more difficult) increases adverse
selection, and may also reduce the supply of credit. Collateral values may be
reduced, which again would tend to increase adverse selection. And borrowers
with low net worth (due to an asset price collapse) offer greater moral hazard to
lenders, as they have less to lose by default. High-risk borrowers typically suffer in
a “flight to quality”. Finally, if there are bank runs, a sound bank can protect itself
by increasing liquidity at the expense of loans, again leading to a contraction of
credit. Asymmetric information also gives a view of the spillover effects of
financial crises on the real economy. Developing from the financial-fragility
paradigm, Bernanke (1983) suggests that bank failures eg in the Great Depression
destroyed private information on borrowers, raising real costs of intermediation,
inducing credit rationing and widespread insolvencies.
We suggest that an industrial analysis based on the effects of changes in entry
conditions in financial markets (Davis (1995a)) can provide a supplementary set of
underlying factors and transmission mechanisms. Easing of entry barriers may be
caused by deregulation, technical progress or market developments reducing the
comparative advantage of incumbents over new entrants. Note that such a
framework does not require actual new entry – rather, the key is that the sunk
(irrecoverable) costs of market entry should decline. This may be reflected in more
competitive behaviour by incumbents, in order to protect themselves from the
threat of entry. It is commonly observed that such changes in entry barriers do not
merely entail reductions in profits and/or smooth elimination of excess capacity,
but rather that reductions in spreads and increases in quantities of credit go beyond
the equilibrium level, (ie the level at which lenders can make normal profits on
their lending business on average over the cycle), leaving the institutions involved
vulnerable to financial instability. Drawing on the theories outlined above and7
applying the logic of market competition, it is argued that the following
mechanisms  inter alia, may play a role:
· To the extent that new entrants to financial markets can induce borrowers to
switch away from established credit relationships or offer extra credit (by
offering lower prices), information-based linkages will be weakened and
existing information devalued7.
· Uncertainty may be increased by new entry. Incumbents may be unable
accurately to predict the responses of new entrants to changing conditions, and
their existing knowledge of market dynamics will be rendered less useful.
Entrants, inexperienced in the market, will face even greater uncertainty.
Unaware of the dynamics of supply and demand in the market, they may be
prone to herd-like behaviour, for example all lending to the same type of client.
When the market itself is new, (or after liberalisation, where interest rate
controls prevented lending to risky borrowers), all institutions will face
uncertainty.
· Competition may cause firms to make inadequate provision for uncertain events
such as financial crisis, because firms that make adequate provision are
undercut by those disregarding such possibilities for reasons of ignorance or
competitive advantage (cf. the “credit rationing” paradigm noted above). New
entrants may be particularly prone to such undercutting.
· Sufficiently short time-horizons may even make firms disregard systematic
risks such as the economic cycle in their risk appraisals, and so again, via the
process of competition, help to reduce the prudential standards for the whole
market. Hit-and-run entry as predicted by the theory of contestable markets
must by its nature have a short-time horizon.8
· Competition for market share, as stressed by managerial theories of the firm -
an approach frequently adopted by entrants, or in new and developing markets -
may lead to cumulative reductions in market prices until it is checked by losses
                    
7  Conceptually, new lenders may be seen as "cannibalising" existing market information and
structure, to the detriment of existing firms. Despite this, however, new lenders are still likely to
lend on the basis of inadequate or asymmetric information during the initial stages. Thus for both
types of lender, entry may lead to a lowering of credit standards.
8  Besides the features outlined above, which are of particular importance in financial markets,
there are several more general features of competitive processes may cause overshooting of
competitive equilibrium. Firms earning normal profits on their existing products may all be
simultaneously attracted to situations offering potential for growth, but individual firms are
unable to predict in advance whether rivals will follow. Such tendencies will be particularly
marked if there is no clear ordering of firms in terms of likelihood of success. Once investments
are sunk, entry decisions may be difficult to reverse. Moreover, if there are sunk costs, firms may
find it optimal to stay in the market for some time even if they make losses, as they will lose
sunk costs of reputation etc. if they leave. During this period, they may be vulnerable to adverse
conditions in financial markets.8
for participants, and withdrawal or retrenchment. Such competition may persist
if participants can cross subsidise their operations from others making excess
profits (ie there is a market failure elsewhere) and they are relatively immune to
take-overs, as is the case for banks in most countries. Evaluation of loan
officers over a short period on the basis of current lending performance is
typical of market-share oriented banks.
Fitting in to the context of this industrial analysis (Keeley (1990)9 highlights the
incentives for risk-taking provided by banks operating at low equity values. He
shows that deregulation may lead directly to incentives for risk-taking by financial
institutions, even abstracting from the safety net (see below). In a regulated market,
where banks have a degree of market power in making loans, the bank’s charter is a
capital asset, and banks have incentives not to risk failure by reducing capital or
increasing asset risk, even in the presence of a safety net.  Deregulation that
facilitates new entry, or that liberalises rate-setting on bank liabilities, reduces the
value of the charter, especially for banks in protected local markets that rely on
non-price competition to attract funds. Risk-taking becomes more attractive, as the
potential loss from bankruptcy is lower, and hence a higher mean and variance of
profits may be sought. Such incentives will of course be increased by mispriced
safety net protection.
As noted, in our view these theories are best seen as not mutually exclusive, but
rather as identifying relevant, though partial, features of financial instability. This
becomes apparent when considering features of actual periods of financial
instability (as in Lecture Two). Hence, there is a need to select key features from
the full range of these theories to develop data needs for macroprudential
surveillance. We now go on to add two additional points on the theory side, before
considering what data needs the various theories highlight.
1.2  Additional considerations - the safety net and international aspects
Besides the main theories of "domestic financial instability", it is relevant briefly to
consider the importance of regulation and of international aspects.
Regulation is clearly an appropriate response to potential systemic risks in
financial markets. But it must first be noted that inadequacies in regulation may
heighten tendencies to take excessive risks.  For example, if it is considered that all
                    
9 See also Marcus (1984), which introduced the concept of charter value, Demsetz et al (1996)
which provides micro evidence, and the recent contribution by Milne and Whalley (1998).9
banks getting into difficulties will be saved, increases in competition (in particular
on the part of new entrants) may lead to incentives to take excessive risks, ignoring
the externalities imposed on other intermediaries (who also help finance the lender
of last resort) and on the lender of last resort itself. Moreover, lenders in the
interbank market may not have the correct incentives to discriminate between
banks (by price or quantity rationing) and discourage risk–takers.10
Although this lecture series is about domestic financial crises, it can be argued that
international elements should not be disregarded.11 Indeed, one factor missing
from the above “closed-economy” theories is consideration of the role of
international capital flows. Traditionally, the focus of the literature on exchange
rate crises (Krugman (1991)) has been on the possible gains from speculation
against a depreciation of a fixed parity, given the size of the nation’s foreign
exchange reserves and various fundamental factors, notably the net external asset
position and the balance of payments. Some models suggest that such a process is
akin to bank runs described above.
The contribution of international capital flows to recent crises and their
international transmission (see Table 2B, page 35) introduce a number of
additional elements. In particular there is the issue of exchange rate pressure,
resisted by the authorities  via interest rate increases, which may trigger or
aggravate financial instability. Second, one may instance the complications
introduced by the financing of the public or private sector in foreign currency,
which makes balance-sheet positions sensitive to exchange rates, and leads to a
potential link from depreciation in the context of a currency crisis to more general
financial instability. This danger will be especially acute if foreign exchange
reserves are too low  to cover the debts in foreign currency, – or are already
exhausted by the preceding currency crisis.  In this context, note that financial
liberalisation was often linked to removal of controls on capital movements,
allowing newly liberalised financial intermediaries to take on yet more risk by
borrowing in foreign currency.12
                    
10 In the case of excessive regulatory protection, “excessive competition” can arise despite
knowledge by lenders of the true probabilities of cyclical shocks and even the distribution of
disastrous outcomes. As a consequence institutions may hold inadequate capital on a risk
adjusted basis.
11 Nevertheless, we acknowledge that a fuller treatment of international aspects would require a
paper in itself.
12 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) show that currency crises are often preceded or accompanied
by banking crises.10
Third, there is the increasing role of institutional investors as a conduit for capital
flows. As they are under severe pressure to perform in line with peers, they are
particularly likely to “herd” into rising markets and to seek rapid withdrawal from
falling markets, destabilising domestic financial markets and exchange rates (Davis
1995c). Fourth, there is a possible link of contagion where there are cross-country
similarities in trade patterns (Glick and Rose (1998)). More generally, the features
noted in the ‘domestic’ theories may generalise to an international level, such as
new entry to international lending of institutions  that may lack adequate
information on their customers; the role of confidence (eg in currency pegs);
banking panics and contagion at an international level; credit rationing (manifested
eg in tiering of interest rates for banks from a given country); and moral hazard.
1.3  Financial data requirements for analysing risks to financial stability,
derived from theory
What are the main indicator variables indicated by the theories, and which may be
used as "building blocks" in the more detailed selection of data in Lecture Three?
The theory of debt and financial fragility tends to emphasise the importance of
rising corporate or household debt accumulation relative to assets as indicating
vulnerability to financial instability. This may accompany fixed-investment booms,
especially in real property, or (more generally) long-term and rapid overall
economic growth. Asset-price increases typically accompany such patterns. Again,
a move to short-term debt, a rise in income gearing and a shift of the corporate or
household sector into deficit may give warnings of imminent heightened fragility.
Consequently, there is a need to focus on prices, quantities and maturities in credit
(loan or bond) markets, overall macroeconomic and investment trends, sector-
balances and asset prices.
The monetarist approach clearly emphasises the growth of monetary aggregates as
a factor preceding financial instability. A classic pattern is accommodation of
excessive monetary growth, accompanying rising inflation, followed by a sharp
and unexpected rise in official interest rates to combat such inflation, and flat or
declining monetary aggregates accompanying a banking panic. But this is only one
possible pattern of monetary developments that might precede instability. Another
is pressure on a fixed exchange rate due to a loss of competitiveness, in the context
of inflation leading to abandonment of a currency peg and resulting solvency
problems for those borrowing in foreign currency. Overall, the implication is that
besides a focus on monetary data and actual and expected inflation per se,  we
need to consider  scenarios of abandonment of the authorities’ central approach to11
monetary policy and its consequences for the burden of indebtedness in the
economy.  A critical assessment of monetary policy is needed in this context, eg in
the light of trends in real exchange rates in the case of a currency peg.
The means of assessing the risks of bank runs13 may include the range of indicators
of banks’ conditions that micro (ie individual bank) data on balance sheets and
profit and loss can provide. These include capital adequacy, overall interest rate
margins, returns on assets or equity, the nature of banks’ assets and loan
concentration to sectors or borrowers.14 As wholesale depositors are often seen as
readier to “run” than retail,15  the balance between types of funding is also
important. Meanwhile, interbank claims may give evidence on the counterparty
risk arising from direct exposures; and the structure and similarity of banks’
balance sheets may offer information as to whether contagion could operate via
this route. These suggestions imply use of micro data on the banks’ balance sheets
and profit and loss, and a focus on the mean and distribution of balance-sheet
structures in the banking sector. Detection of major individual banks that may be
“outliers” is also important, although this raises the issue of identifying ‘core’
banks (eg by criteria such as size, payments system activity or international scope).
Price data such as spreads between interbank claims and risk-free assets such as
treasury bills (or on a longer-term basis, between bank bonds and government
bonds)  give an indication of  the markets' overall risk perceptions for the banking
sector. Bank share prices are a complementary indicator, although they are less
accurate indicators of changing credit risk. Finally, there may be important
qualitative information  about how likely it is that insolvency will become
contagious. These include the details, timeliness and frequency of disclosure to
regulators or shareholders, whether the interbank market is collateralised, whether
the payments system is net or gross, regulation of over-the-counter positions, and
perceptions of the credibility of the central banks and regulatory authority.
Vulnerability of markets to liquidity failure has historically tended to coincide with
small numbers of market makers with low levels of capitalisation, often in markets
that have grown rapidly, and/or failure of investors who had held a large
proportion of market assets. Extreme forms of herding and adoption of similar
strategies by borrowers or investors has also tended to be a feature. Adverse
                    
13 We do not subscribe to the view that banking crises are "sunspots" or random events, but do
acknowledge that crises may have a self-fulfilling element (which may be linked to uncertainty),
such that the scale of crises may be out of line with gravity of the initial shock.
14 In particular, sectors whose returns are subject to sharp variability, such as property
companies.
15  First, such depositors have better information than their retail counterparts; second, they tend
not to be covered by deposit insurance.12
consequences depend on the degree of dependence on market financing of key
agents in the financial or non-financial sectors.
Uncertainty, credit-rationing and asymmetric-information theories in a way
summarise the previous types of theory, and highlight many of the same variables.
They highlight in particular the pattern of loan spreads over time (with a marked
deviation from long-term averages, first in excessive compression and then on the
upside reflecting adverse selection and credit rationing), and the incidence of
competition and herding, (eg into new markets) by financial institutions. Rapid
growth of markets, in particular those for new financial instruments, typically
require vigilance owing to the heightened uncertainty and the likely incidence of
“disaster myopia”. Uncertainty itself may be suitably proxied by volatility of
options prices or parameter estimates derived from GARCH models. Credit-
rationing cycles may be predicted by falling bank capital ratios and new access to
credit by sectors that were previously rationed. Theories stressing asymmetric
information focus in particularly on the importance of net worth of borrowers as an
indicator of potential moral hazard and adverse selection. This may be proxied by
equity and property prices, or debt/equity ratios. It may be noted that a fall in
inflation can also reduce net worth in real terms by increasing the real value and
burden of fixed-rate debt.
The industrial analysis introduces some additional potential elements to financial
surveillance. In particular, it would tend to stress the need for careful attention to
changes in market structure and behaviour. New entry is an obvious indicator, but
as emphasised by the theory of contestable markets, even potential competition is
enough to generate changes in behaviour that may have systemic consequences via
uncertainty, disaster myopia etc. A strand of the empirical literature on banking has
developed indicators of contestability derived from the properties of bank revenue
functions (see De Bandt and Davis (1998)).16 In addition, a number of the features
discussed above again come to the fore, such as patterns of herding into new and
rapidly growing markets, market-share competition, and narrowing margins as
competition increases. Deregulation is seen as a common trigger for overlending,
which may be accompanied by objective measures of the presence of excess
capacity in the banking sector (such as low profitability and high branch-to-
population ratios). As is well known, the generosity and degree of mispricing of
the safety net in combination with low charter values may also enhance risk-taking.
The history of “rescues” in terms of deposit insurance in addition to bank equity
                    
16   The intuition is that if revenues rise in line with costs, the industry is behaving in a
contestable manner, whereas if they are unrelated, there is a form of monopoly.13
values, non-performing loans and capital adequacy may come to the fore in this
context.17
International elements to add to the above include resistance to exchange rate
pressure by the authorities (by intervention, or interest rate rises), the scope of
foreign-currency borrowing (also relative to foreign exchange reserves), and the
nature of capital inflows generally. The current preferences of the institutional
investor community, and whether all are adopting similar investment strategies,
may help one to predict unsustainable levels of capital inflows. It is also relevant to
know how far the economy in question is vulnerable to shocks e.g. affecting
commodity prices.
Hence, the theory give a rich menu of suggested data for macroprudential
surveillance. However, we emphasise that complementary analysis of actual
experience is needed before coming to any definitive views on data selection.
Judgment is also needed as to what existing data are best used to illustrate the
effects that the theories highlight. In Lecture Two, we turn to actual experience.
LECTURE 2:  DERIVING INDICATOR VARIABLES FROM
EXPERIENCE OF FINANCIAL INSTABILITY
2.1  Types of financial instability
The variety of theories outlined in Lecture One might suggest that financial crises
themselves come in many different forms. In fact, historical experience suggests
that financial instability manifests itself in three main ways, although within these
broad groups there are many sub-categories and further distinctions to be made
(see Table 1 on page 33). It is suggested that study of these types of instability, in
the context of the specific features of particular crises and in the light of theory,
can help in pinpointing data needs.
One generic type of crisis is bank failures following loan or trading losses. This
may link to the full range of behaviour outlined in the theories. Examples (see
Table 1) include the LDC debt crisis, the banking crises in Japan, the Nordic
countries and Australia, the US thrifts crisis and the Asian crisis. Many developing
countries have suffered such crises in recent decades. Within those banking crises,
one may distinguish those that were confined to the domestic financial system as
                    
17   Non-performing loans may be of particular relevance, as they give an indication of risks to
capital adequacy from future write-offs.14
from those that are also linked to cross-border bank lending and indebtedness in
foreign currencies (LDC debt, Asia).18
A second type involves extreme market price-volatility after a shift in expectations.
Such crises are distinctive in that they tend to involve institutional investors as
principals, and are focused mainly on the consequences for financial institutions of
sharp price changes which result from institutional “herding” as groups of such
institutions imitate one another’s strategies. Whereas violent price movements may
in themselves not have systemic implications,19 these may emerge when such
movements threaten eg institutions that have taken leveraged positions on the
current levels of asset prices. Examples are the stock-market crash of 1987, the
ERM crisis, the 1994 bond market reversal and the Mexican crisis. There were also
elements of this in the Asian crisis.
A third type, which is linked to the second, involves protracted20 collapse of
market liquidity and issuance. Also often involving institutional herding, the
distinction from the second type is often largely one of whether markets are
sufficiently resilient, and whether market-maker structures are suitably robust. In
addition,  such crises tend to occur in debt rather than equity or foreign exchange
markets. The risks are acute not only for those holding positions in the market, but
also for those relying on the market for debt finance or liquidity, which
increasingly include banks. Examples in the past have tended typically to be rather
specific and idiosyncratic markets, which by nature relied on a narrow investor
base, market-maker structure and/or issuer base (junk bonds, floating-rate notes,
Swedish commercial paper, Ecu bonds). However, the events in 1998 following
the Russian default and the rescue of the hedge fund Long Term Capital
Management (LTCM)  were much more serious, as liquidity failure was threatened
in markets such as the US securities repurchase (repo), swaps, commercial paper
(CP), corporate and Treasury bond market (see IMF (1998b), Davis (1999)). The
main historical precedent was the Penn Central Bankruptcy and its effect on the US
commercial paper market. In these cases, liquidity was threatened in core markets,
thus leading the US authorities to take decisive action.
A cross-cutting set of distinctions may be made in terms of the broad causes of
financial instability. Here, one may highlight that a number of crisis situations
                    
18   Note that both types of crisis were at times linked to international economic developments
hitting the macroeconomy.
19 They may, however, lead to resource misallocation.
20 It is not denied that all sharp price changes will tend to affect market liquidity to a greater or
lesser degree.15
began with financial deregulation (such as the Scandinavian and Japanese banking
crises), with the behaviour of financial institutions in the wake of this
“displacement” leading to a build-up of corporate and personal debt to
unsustainable levels, and then to financial fragility. More generally, deregulated
financial systems may be more subject to instability in the longer term (see
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998b) and Section 2.3). Second, there are crises
characterised by disintermediation and reintermediation of financial flows from
banks to non-banks (such as the UK secondary banking crisis (1973) and the initial
US thrifts crisis (1980)), which has proven a cause of difficulty for the institutions
facing adverse flows of funds. A third sub-category is financial instability caused
by the failure of a single large institution whose position at the core of the financial
system has potential consequences out of proportion to its size (such as Continental
Illinois). Commodities (LDC debt) and property-related lending and speculation
(secondary banking, Scandinavia, Japan) have been a significant source of
instability in the past, owing to their heavy demands for capital, and uncertain
returns due to cyclical instability of prices.
One can also distinguish those crises linked to international debt, where the
additional complication of foreign-currency liabilities enters the picture (Asia,
LDC debt). Finally, there are crises with an equity- market linkage, whose
systemic aspect may reflect the presence of leveraged institutions recycling money
back into the market, “illusions of liquidity” due to innovative trading techniques,
or equity held as an asset on banks’ books (eg the stock market crash of 1987, and
the recent banking difficulties in Japan).
Finally, experience suggests that there are some institutional preconditions for
financial stability.  Durable stability is unlikely if monetary policy is capricious
and unpredictable, or where there is no provision for a safety net or regulation of
capital adequacy. More generally, volatile inflation has often been a precursor to
instability (see Caprio and Klingebiel (1996)).
2.2  Data requirements for analysing risks to financial stability, derived from
stylised patterns of instability
Tables 2A and 2B (pages 34 and 35) summarise the features of selected individual
financial crises from 1933-98. The tables highlight a restricted set of key features
drawn from the overall listing suggested by the theory. We consider these to be the
most basic data-set that is suggested by actual experience as being common to
crises in the past. They complement the broader set of variables highlighted by16
theory and presented in Section 1.3, and suggest possible ways of streamlining the
required dataset.
Notably, in advance of crises, the stress is laid on:
- Unanticipated regime shifts towards laxity on the part of monetary, fiscal or
regulatory authorities
- Debt accumulation (economy-wide, by individual sectors or in individual
markets)
- Asset price booms (in either property or equity prices)
- Concentration of risk on the part of financial institutions (implying excessive
optimism in respect of potential “correlations”)
- New entry of intermediaries to the relevant market
- Financial innovation (and rapid growth of the markets concerned)
- Declining capital adequacy of financial institutions
- And finally, monetary tightening or unanticipated regime shifts towards rigour
on the part of monetary, fiscal and regulatory authorities.
Of course, many of these features have occurred separately without entailing a
crisis, and indeed are part of the normal functioning of a market economy. It is
their combination and acuteness that is crucial. There are conceptual distinctions
between these features: monetary or other forms of policy tightening is a triggering
mechanism that may indeed be warranted by the other elements, whereas most of
the other elements are propagation mechanisms arising from an initial shock (such
as regime shifts towards laxity, changes in regulation or technology in the real
economy or financial markets, see Section 3.3). Moreover, not all of these features
were present in all cases. Nevertheless, we suggest that they constitute a useful
checklist derived from actual experience – and that the experiences themselves
warrant considerable attention.
The impact of the crises can be judged by the last six elements in the table, namely
credit rationing, market liquidity failure and/or bank runs; contagion between
markets or institutions; international transmission; action by the authorities; a
severe macroeconomic impact;21 and in some cases dysfunction of financial system
and economic collapse. Although the last item is fortunately rare, its potential
                    
21   The macroeconomic impact may be direct  (eg via shifts in private or public sector financial
balances) or indirect, as effects of a crisis on GDP or imports of a country in difficulties affects
other countries’ exports and GDP, possibly inducing further financial stability.  The latter may
be seen as a form of "real contagion".17
incidence as well as that of severe macroeconomic consequences reminds of the
importance of detecting incipient financial crises well in advance.
2.3  A cross-check from econometric studies
Continuing to assess the lessons of experience, we now evaluate a number of
recent econometric studies of the incidence of banking crises, which have sought to
assess which financial and macroeconomic developments are closely linked to the
emergence of such systemic crises. We consider that such studies provide a useful
cross-check on the data needs for macroprudential surveillance, and their results
may be a useful back-up to more judgmental analyses of financial crises. However,
there are in our view considerable risks to strong reliance on such tools, as they
omit the crucial element of judgement required, as well as failing to allow for the
changing nature of financial markets, and the risks that may arise in the context of
securities market intermediation. There may be important non-linearities, for
example in the switch by banks from risk-averse to risk-loving behaviour as
charter values decline, which linear econometric estimates may miss (although the
logit model may give a helpful approximation to such behaviour). Furthermore,
they may not detect the build-up to crises – which may take several years, - by
focusing on the period when a crisis occurs, or that immediately preceding it.
A typical study is that of Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a), who estimated
a multivariate logit model, using data from a sample of 53 developing and
developed countries over 1980-94. Banking crises were defined to occur in the
context of at least one of the following: non-performing assets/total assets ratio of
more than 10%, cost of a rescue of more 2% of GDP, large-scale nationalisation of
banks, bank runs, and emergency measures such as deposit freezes/bank
holidays/generalised deposit insurance policies. They pinpointed low economic
growth and high inflation as key macroeconomic indicators of the probability of
financial crises. High real short-term interest rates – often implemented in the
context of a need to bring inflation under control - were also associated with
systemic banking problems, as well as vulnerability to balance of payments
problems (proxied by an adverse terms-of-trade shock) and to sharp capital
outflows (ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves). Explicit deposit insurance
schemes made crises more likely, pointing to a link to moral hazard in the context
of the safety net. Interestingly, bank liquidity (bank cash and reserves as a
proportion of bank assets), exposure to the private sector (ratio of loans to the
private sector to total loans) and lagged credit growth were not significant at
conventional levels (two  years lagged credit growth was significant at 10%).
Fiscal deficits and exchange rate depreciations were also insignificant.18
Another paper by Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1998) criticised this exercise for
including contemporaneous variables, thus risking  mixing causes and
consequences of a banking crisis. They sought to identify only leading indicators
by looking only at lagged variables in their logit estimates and also seeing the pre-
crisis year as a separate event from the crisis. Nevertheless, they came up with a
comparable set of indicators, focusing on data from 38 countries from  1980-97.
They found that banking distress is associated with a sharp fall in GDP growth;
boom-bust cycles of inflation, credit expansion and capital inflows; rising real
interest rates and an increasing incremental capital output ratio; declining bank
deposits; a sharp fall in the real exchange rate, declining imports and an adverse
terms-of trade-shock. They noted that there are regional differences in indicators,
with the Asian difficulties (see Section 3.4) being preceded by credit growth and
rising foreign liabilities, which proxied the vulnerability of the banking and
corporate sectors.
Third, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) examined 20 developed and developing
countries from 1970-95, to assess macroeconomic variables whose behaviour is
systematically different in the period prior to banking and currency crises. Banking
crises were preceded by recession, declines in the terms of trade, stock-market
crashes, real exchange rate appreciation, lending booms, increases in the money
multiplier, and increases in real interest rates. Meanwhile, Gonzalez-Hermosillo et
al (1997) found using Mexican data that bank-specific indicators and banking-
sector variables (proxying contagion) indicate the likelihood of bank failure,
whereas macroeconomic variables help to predict the timing of it.
In further work, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998b) looked at the effect of
financial liberalisation, using a dummy variable for the deregulation of bank
interest rates as the defining event. They found that banking crises were more
likely to occur in liberalised financial systems, controlling for the variables set out
above. Crises tended to occur a few years after liberalisation, and were linked to a
decline in bank franchise value, possibly because monopoly power is eroded.
(Bank franchise value was proxied by returns on equity.) This is consistent with
the “industrial approach” to financial instability set out in Lecture 1. The crises
were rendered more severe if the overall institutional environment of a country was
underdeveloped, eg with low GDP per capita, and poor rule-of-law, quality of
bureaucracy and contract enforcement.
In sum, the econometric estimates provide a complementary list of variables for
macroprudential surveillance, although the caveats surrounding the practical use of
such studies should be borne in mind.19
LECTURE 3 : SUGGESTED DATA NEEDS AND A PRACTICAL
APPLICATION
3.1  Overall considerations in selecting data
With the suggestions put forward in Lectures One and Two as background, in this
final lecture we seek to define a detailed data-set of indicators of financial
instability, and offer suggestions as to their use. We also provide an illustration of
application in the Asian crisis, including an examination of warning signs readily
available in the case of Thailand in June 1997. Note that the approach here is to
combine on a selective basis the data suggestions set out in Sections 1.3 and 2.2,
but to add value by defining the actual data items as precisely as possible.
In deriving data needs for financial surveillance from the theory and the stylised
patterns outlined in the first lecture, an important consideration is economy in
terms of the number of indicators employed. Failure in this regard may lead to
including virtually all financial and economic data in macroprudential surveillance,
and thus risking to fail to distinguish key warning patterns. A second is to derive
data needs directly from theory and experience as outlined above. A central issue is
then to assess what combinations of variables can offer consistent warning signs
for potential turbulence, and its potential severity. What, in other words, can help
us to give advance warning of a crisis? Third, the data needs will have to be
sufficiently qualitative and general to cater for the fact that crises in the future are
likely to differ from those in the past,22 whether in terms of markets affected,
incidence or nature of resulting contagion.  Fourth, and more generally, there will
be an important qualitative aspect which extends beyond data per se to the
inferences and assessments that central banks, supervisory authorities and market
players may draw in the course of their normal operational activities.  We consider
this and other qualitative aspects to be crucial inputs to macroprudential
surveillance.
Often it will be important to assess what the benchmark is for assessing risks to
financial stability, a norm against which a current situation may be judged. For
example average spreads over a long period provide a benchmark for the price of
credit although judgement is needed in the light of changes in the credit quality of
borrowers, as well as the occurrence of financial liberalisation. A more
sophisticated approach would be to estimate equations for spreads (which could
                    
22   Indeed, there is a clear danger of “fighting the last war” in seeking excessively precise and
detailed data,  rather than seeking broad patterns in the data.20
make credit quality and liberalisation exogenous variables) and assess deviations
from predicted values out of sample. Cross- country benchmarks may in this
context be helpful, although “normal levels” in terms of prices or quantities may
also depend on the nature of financial relations and broad elements of financial
structure within an economy. For example, traditionally relationship-banking
countries have been able to sustain higher levels of corporate debt relative to equity
or GDP than is prudent in those characterised by transactions banking  (and,
correspondingly, financial-asset price volatility is seen as less damaging to the
macroeconomy). Even these patterns are not fixed, however, and a decline in the
scope of banking relations may warrant, for example, a lower debt-equity ratio
than would otherwise be the case.23.
Another set of norms based in quantity data may be in terms of the abnormal
growth of a certain financial market, which may indicate that risk-taking is high or
increasing, and/or less experienced players are becoming involved. (However,
indicators of pricing are needed to confirm adverse shifts in risk-taking.)
In the light of these considerations, we now assess overall data needs. It will be
borne in mind that  in going through the various theories in Lecture One, it was
evident that there are considerable overlaps both in the explanations and the data
needs. Equally, the stylised patterns of instability set out in Lecture Two tend to
emphasise several of the theories, again suggesting a need for synthesis.
3.2 Types of financial data required for macroprudential surveillance
As mentioned, our broad generic data-set selectively combines these indicators
suggested from theory and experience in Sections 1.3 and 2.3, while seeking as far
as possible to offer variables that may actually be found in current datasets. We
look at the variety of data highlighted in terms of types of data, (see in Table 3,
page 36).  The types of data are: flow-of-funds data, financial prices, monetary
data, detailed data on banks, qualitative data, external data and macroeconomic
data.  Drawing on Lectures One and Two, Table 3 also shows the typical sign of
change for each given variable in advance of financial instability. Note that in
some cases variables have two signs, showing the pattern during the longer-term
build-up to a crisis and when it is about to occur.
                    
23  Such a shift is widely predicted in the context of EMU, see Davis (1998).21
We should emphasise at the outset that this ideal set of data will not always be
available in emerging-market economies.  Section 3.4 on the Asian crisis
highlights some of the narrower data-set that may be usable and available for such
countries. Nevertheless, we see such analysis as an imperfect substitute, and
encourage the necessary deepening of the statistical infrastructure.
First, there is a need for flow-of-funds data (in the form of flow and stock data).24
This is required crucially in order to track overall patterns of corporate and
household sector gross indebtedness, relative to income (sectoral income or GDP)
or gross financial or total assets.  Also relevant are corporate sector gross
debt/equity ratios; related shifts by households or companies into financial deficit
(defined relative to GDP); rises in income gearing (interest payments as a
proportion of income); shifts in the pattern of intermediation towards or away from
the banking sector (as shown by the total assets of banks relative to non-bank
financial institutions); and rapid growth of lending in any individual market, to a
given sector or region. In the flow-of-funds context, information on investment
patterns of institutional investors, the balance between sources of corporate debt
finance in banking and bond markets (to assess vulnerability to crises in different
institutions or markets) and maturity of debt (where short-term debt implies
heightened risks) may also be helpful. Flow-of-funds data should also provide
broad measures of the developments in banking (eg balance-sheet expansion and
capital adequacy), although data on income and expenditure and micro data
(discussed below) must supplement this. Some proxies can be suggested if there
are no flow-of-funds data; in particular, the private sector deficit may be tracked by
identity using the public sector and external sector financial positions (since the
three together add to zero).  Private sector debt may be proxied by the stock of
bank lending to the non-bank private sector as a proportion of GDP.
Second, various financial prices may give a valuable direct indicator of the degree
of risk perceived by markets, notably in respect of spreads on bank liabilities ie
money-market and bond yield spreads over government/risk-free rates, and spreads
on corresponding company liabilities (notably spreads on corporate bonds and
bank loans to companies over government bonds (for fixed rate) and interbank
rates (for floating). As noted, a benchmark is also needed, ie an indicator of what a
"normal difference" is. A comparison of bank and corporate spreads should enable
a view to be taken of whether underpricing (prior to a crisis) and risk-aversion
(after the crisis) are localised in the corporate sector or also extend to the banking
                    
24 Note that many countries lack such a dataset, and the OECD has ceased to publish
comparative data on corporate balance sheets.22
sector. Meanwhile, asset prices such as share price indices25 and, particularly,
property prices, may offer an indication of the degree of collateral available to
lenders. Rapid rises in property prices have often foreshadowed equally precipitate
falls, with loans going into default. Where property prices are unavailable, share
prices of property companies can give a proxy. Judgment as to the deviation of
asset prices from fundamentals will again be crucial in this regard. Finally, bank
share prices give a view of the equity value of banks, and hence the risk of
insolvency.
Third, monetary data together with inflation and nominal GDP projections are
needed in order to assess whether growth in a broad monetary aggregate such as
M2 or M3 is dangerously rapid (requiring future tightening of policy) or low or
negative (threatening the financial sector with systemic risks).   Velocity (the ratio
of nominal GDP to money) offers useful supplementary information, although it
will also be influenced by financial innovation and liberalisation.
Correspondingly, the real short-term interest rate (ie the risk-free or interbank rate
less the current rate of inflation) may give a view as to whether the monetary
stance is unduly loose or tight. The credit counterpart of money (credit to the non-
bank sectors) may give a rough indicator of incipient debt problems, in the absence
of more detailed flow-of-funds data. Breakdowns of monetary data to show
lending by sub-sectors of banking and to various industrial sectors and regions will
be helpful in pinpointing potential risks that may be obscured by aggregate data.
Fourth, there is a need for more detailed data on banks and if possible other
financial institutions with maturity mismatch which are thus subject to the risk of
runs (eg investment banks).  Such data would need to be as timely as possible to be
useful. Ideally, there should be micro data on individual institutions’ balance sheets
and profit and loss, which allow identification of averages across the sector,
distributions within the sector and large individual outliers. These should include
data on capital adequacy, liquidity (such as the maturity mismatch or currency
mismatch), margins (ie net interest income as a proportion of assets), non-
performing loans relative to capital, and overall returns on assets or equity. In a
time-series form, such data should allow a view to be taken of the evolving
competitive situation in the banking sector, new entry and the risks of excess
capacity. A specific estimation of so called "H-statistics" for the banking sector
(see De Bandt and Davis (1998)) year-by-year may give a direct indication of
contestability of banking markets - the variables needed in addition to those noted
above include measures of individual banks’ costs and revenues.
                    
25   In countries such as Japan, share prices also enter the calculation of banks’ capital.23
Fifth, various types of qualitative data are required. These include recent easing of
financial regulation that could provoke high-risk behaviour, and technological
changes, which may affect entry barriers to financial markets. A proxy for
liberalisation, suggested by the IMF (1998a), is the ratio of broad money to narrow
money. Macroeconomic policy items in respect of the monetary regime, as well as
the nature of the safety net as perceived by market participants, also fall into this
category. In addition, there is a need for qualitative data on the scope of financial
innovation and the potential for correlations between market prices. Data on
aspects of financial infrastructure will give a view of the likelihood of financial
instability becoming contagious (such as whether the interbank market is
collateralised, whether the payments system is net or gross, regulation of over-the-
counter positions and perceptions of the credibility of the central banks and
regulatory authority).
Finally, as noted, there are important qualitative insights available from operational
activities of central banks, supervisors and market participants which are likely to
be available in advance of any disclosure, published and numerical data as well as
helping the interpretation of such data.  We should highlight in particular
information on the strategies of banks and whether they indicate eg  a particular
focus on lending to a certain sector, as well as intelligence gathered from market
contacts about buildups of positions and regarding the risks being undertaken by
key players.  Such intelligence will be of particular importance when the risk of
financial instability is acute.  The challenge is to systemise and organise the use
made of such intelligence in the light of theory and past experience of crises.
External data needed, besides the current account as a proportion of GDP and the
real exchange rate, include the range of international banking data provided by the
BIS for non-OECD countries, or, correspondingly, capital account data for OECD
countries. These should enable one to pinpoint the scope of international foreign-
currency lending, its maturity and sectoral distribution, and the difference between
short-term liabilities of a country in foreign currency and short-term assets (i.e.
largely, foreign exchange reserves). Similarity of trade patterns across countries in
terms of products and markets served may give evidence of the risk of contagion
across countries.
Finally, complementing the financial data, overall macroeconomic data are
required in order to assess the current state of the cycle, notably the state of real
business fixed investment (both overall and in real-estate). Real GDP data should
show whether the cycle is sufficiently long-standing that a downturn may be24
expected  or forecast26 soon, and aid a judgment as to whether prices and quantities
in credit markets are consistent with such a prospect. The information should
ideally be regional as well as national (although most systemic crises have been at
a national rather than regional level). Inflation gives additional evidence on the
ease and tightness of monetary policy. Forecasts and expectations of GDP and
inflation may give valuable further evidence on likely outturns, and on previous
outturns on the basis of which financial decisions are being made. Any discrepancy
may in itself offer a cause for concern that errors are under way.
3.3  How should data be examined?
The essential point is to seek to detect emerging patterns of financial instability in
advance  and gauge their gravity when they occur  by observing the overall pattern
of economic and financial developments in a judgmental manner, informed by the
events of the past that have entailed systemic risks, and with a broad conceptual
framework derived from theory to identify appropriate danger signals. These
patterns may include econometric forecasts of the relevant variables as well as
actual data. The overall judgement should of course allow for the fact that some
features, notably fixed-investment booms, have occurred in the past without
leading to overshooting.  Again, asset price falls are, as argued in the Introduction,
not alone sufficient for a financial crisis. In other words, the key issue is the nature
of the combination of the different features that are highlighted here.
Equally, as financial market participants may learn from past errors, crises in the
future will rarely resemble in quantitative terms those in the past. This underlines
the need for judgement, rather than solely data collection. We also suggest that
econometric calculations regarding the overall risk of financial instability could be
constructed and maintained as part of the information set of those involved in
surveillance but not relied upon as a major source of information. It is emphasised
that on their own, real economy or financial data are not sufficient to allow an
overall view of risks to financial stability.  Also, there is a need to combine
qualitative and quantitative aspects.
A useful distinction that may be made in detecting patterns of financial instability
in advance is that between primary shocks or “displacements”, which act as
propagation mechanisms to a cycle of vulnerability to financial instability, and
                    
26 Macroeconomic data are arguably more suitable for forecasting than the bulk of financial
data, although some successful attempts at modelling and forecasting financial data have been
undertaken.25
secondary shocks, which may trigger the episode of financial instability itself. In
general, in macroprudential surveillance employing leading indicators of crises, we
focus on the propagation mechanisms. It is suggested that these are the elements of
financial instability that are most common across individual episodes, which may
follow a wide variety of initial shocks or “displacements”. Meanwhile, the
secondary shocks or triggers for financial instability will be detected too late to be
leading indicators. They may in a sense be the culmination of the propagation
mechanism, a rational response of the authorities to macroeconomic pressures, or
an “accident waiting to happen” in a vulnerable financial system (eg in an
institution, or in its infrastructure).
Digressing for a moment on primary shocks or “displacements” that trigger a cycle
of financial expansion and fragility, they may, for example, include financial
liberalisation, technical progress or innovation in financial markets, changes in
monetary or fiscal policies and policy regimes, economic liberalisation, technical
progress in the real sector in which a country may have a comparative advantage
(such as developments in information technology), reconstruction after a war,
discovery of a new natural resource, increased demand or changing relative prices
for an existing natural resource. A combination of these may be important in some
cases. We stress that such primary shocks are not unimportant. They should give
important clues as to where to look for evidence of financial fragility, e.g. in
lending to the sector concerned or in the markets most affected by financial
liberalisation or innovation. On the other hand, experience also suggests that
“credit cycles” that typically precede financial instability may at times take on a
life of their own, that is at most tenuously linked to the initial cause.
3.4  An application to the Asian crisis
We conclude the series of lectures by looking at events that preceded the 1997
crisis in Asia, as well as the triggers for it from the point of view of theory, past
experience and data (see also Stiglitz 1998, IMF 1998a). It is suggested that the
Asian financial crisis shows a number of elements that have been seen many times
in episodes of financial instability in the past, and which are in line with the
suggestion of theory. This suggests that although Asia had some distinctive
features, warning signs were nonetheless available, using data available at the
time. Of course, this point should not be overstressed in the ‘wisdom of hindsight’.
Moreover, an important point is that the data available from the Asian countries
fell considerably short of that which would ideally be available from a financial-
surveillance point of view and some way short of best practice in OECD countries.26
Notably, sectoral balance sheets and flows-of-funds data; timely, detailed and
accurate balance sheets of companies and banks; and data on property prices were
often unavailable. Nevertheless, the data available in Asia were, we maintain,
sufficient to give warning signs, and could equally be used in most other emerging-
market economies. Table 4 (page 37) shows the quite comprehensive but not
always timely data that were readily available for Thailand in June 1997 to an
international observer. These  would of course be much less detailed than those at
the disposal of domestic authorities.
One element was historically strong economic growth, giving rise to investment
opportunities. Macroeconomic data showed that a characteristic of Asia for many
years was not just rapid and sustained growth but also high investment, which
although initially highly-profitable, began to show lower marginal returns in the
last years before the crisis. Whereas declining returns were partly due to the natural
effects of “catch-up” with advanced countries, they were also linked to
misallocation of resources (to “prestige” projects, “cronies” and increasingly to
excessive real-estate development). A rapid build-up of debt (detectable in terms of
bank lending to the non-financial sector) was a consequence of the most recent
spurt in investment. Rising leverage (commonly in foreign currency, entailing
capital inflows in the form of bank loans and securities as shown by the BIS
banking data) resulted. This reflected sources of funds internal to firms proving
insufficient, equity markets being underdeveloped, domestic interest rates
exceeding foreign ones and overall domestic saving, although high by western
standards, being insufficient to finance investment in domestic currency.
Qualitative information, equity prices, balance of payments and capital-flow
data would highlight these points. Borrowers were happy to leverage themselves
on the basis of buoyant expectations of economic growth as well as rising asset
prices (which, apart from equity prices, would again be derived qualitatively).
The  regime shift from a closed economy to an open economy, like financial
liberalisation in advanced countries, may have caused domestic banks and their
clients to overestimate the ability to pay back loans, because closed-economy
regimes have often been accompanied by segmented financial systems, subject to
quantitative regulation of balance sheets. These would be characterised by low
lending rates and strict credit rationing, which in themselves historically prevented
over-indebtedness and credit losses.
Inadequate credit assessment, and deteriorating overall balance sheet conditions
seem to have been a characteristic both of domestic banks, for structural reasons
(eg inadequate supervision and “crony capitalism”) and of international portfolio
investors and banks. International portfolio investors (whose inflows were apparent27
from national balance of payments data) may have been lulled by the idea that
they could always withdraw funds in an emergency without any loss, as liquidity
would be maintained, and capital controls not imposed, as well as by seeing risks
in emerging markets generally as rather low. Reflecting investor interest, emerging
market eurobond spreads declined between 1995 - 1997 from 1.5% to 0.35%,
while maturities rose from four years in 1991 to eight years in 1996.  (This could
be seen from issuance data in international capital markets, which are also
summarised by the BIS). Banks seem to have sought market entry on uneconomic
terms, according to the data on international bank lending provided by the BIS.
Even though it is premature to draw final conclusions, provisions made in 1997-8
by banks that were active in the region earlier, such as UK banks, have been
smaller than provision made by other European banks, which were active later.
Hence, riskiness of new loans is shown to have increased over time. There may
have been perceptions of implicit safety-net guarantees from governments to
domestic banks that reduced concern over credit risk. The well-known link of new
entry of foreign banks, which may be relatively uninformed, to adverse selection,
appears to have asserted itself.
One may judge that overall, the agents in the situation developed a form of disaster
myopia, disregarding warning signs present in the data such as current account
deficits and loss of real competitiveness, as well as anecdotal evidence of
misallocation of capital in the context of rising leverage and foreign currency
borrowing. Notably, the fact that any change in the exchange rate and rise in
interest rates would expose borrowers to unbearable balance-sheet strains was
seemingly ignored, on the assumption that dollar parities would always be held (or
at least till rollover time), even though the interest rate differential (present in
official interest rates) should have raised some questions about the sustainability
of exchange-rate parities27. Strong fiscal positions and historically stable exchange
rates may have helped to create this impression. Concentration of risk in the
domestic market, where there were relatively few large borrowers, was also a
factor for the local banks in particular, which proved vulnerable to the effects on
their clients of a falling exchange rate and tight monetary policy. Reliance on asset
values in lending is, of course, an inherent characteristic of real-estate lending and,
as noted, such lending became more prevalent prior to the crisis, as real-estate and
equity prices themselves soared.
                    
27 There could even be a bias in a general perception of commitments by governments to peg
currencies. There may be an inclination to “trust” such commitments, as the failure of the
government to peg can be blamed for any later losses if the policy is not maintained.28
There is also evidence of underestimation of “correlations” between asset prices
within one country, as well as within the region as a whole. This issue links credit
risk assessment to interest-rate and exchange-rate risks, as well as to asset
valuation. The potential positive correlation between all these  arguably a lesson
from earlier debt crises such as the Latin American crisis of 1982  had probably
not been taken into account when lending and investing to Asian countries. So the
overall risk, for example, in lending to one region, can be heavily underestimated,
if all different risks are simply summed in a building-block manner, and low
correlations between them are assumed. (Both financial contagion and “real
contagion” operating via effects on export demand may be at the root of such
heightened correlations).
Following such a build-up, the triggers for the crisis appear to have included the
beginnings of a cyclical weakening; declining share prices, reflecting this; pressure
on the exchange rate in the international financial markets (as speculators
perceived vulnerability of the pegs); an unexpected policy regime shift (in the
currency peg); and monetary tightening (to limit depreciation) – all apparent in
the data. These together provoked a further sharp fall in asset prices (bursting of
the bubble), leading borrowers and consequently lenders into acute financial
difficulties. International banking flows reversed themselves sharply. Contagion
between markets and internationally followed, with markets picking on countries
that seemed to have similar characteristics (eg. in terms of losses of real
competitiveness), and/or which had similar exposures in terms of trade patterns
by commodity or main export markets.
Speculators assumed that given corporate debt exposure, and weak financial
systems, high interest rates to defend currencies could not be maintained. It was
noteworthy that all emerging-market countries’ currencies were affected to a
greater or lesser degree, as were stockmarkets globally after the Hong Kong
collapse. The link to bank-run contagion is evident. Credit rationing to the
borrowers concerned intensified, thus enhancing financial difficulties, and bank
runs took place both in the areas most directly affected and also in Japan. Declines
in liquidity of securities markets, arguably the equivalent of a bank run, also were
apparent. Systemic risk threatened; the IMF intervened for fear of major financial
crisis (defined here as a major collapse of the financial system, entailing inability
to provide payments systems and to allocate capital - a realisation of systemic
risk). Broader macroeconomic consequences included a sharp rise in net saving
by the private sector, with devastating consequences for economic growth, as
well as potentially aggravating financial instability.29
Conclusion
This article has suggested that the theory of financial instability and the experience
of financial crises in the past provide sufficient material to enable meaningful use
to be made of financial and macroeconomic data in macroprudential surveillance.
Such data may include econometric forecasts, as well as current information. These
data may be employed in a judgmental manner to provide grounds for vigilance on
the part of central bankers and supervisors, and as a basis for analysis by market
participants.
However, it should also be pointed out that the indicators are in no way precise,
and may all occur separately without financial instability being present or even
threatened. Rather, there is a need for development of broad information on what
constitutes normal conditions in an economy, as well as the patterns that have often
preceded financial crises in the past. Though account should be taken of individual
countries’ special features, eg in respect of sustainable corporate indebtedness,
analysis of experience both at home and abroad is essential; many mistakes have
been made when assuming that countries are in some way unique and hence these
patterns of financial instability are unlikely to arise  or that circumstances are now
different and the lessons of history no longer apply. The globalisation of the world
financial system also makes a narrow focus on individual countries less and less
valid, with a necessity arising in particular of considering international linkages
and broad currency areas such as that of the euro. Meanwhile, we suggest that
econometric estimates of overall fragility (as opposed to individual data items)
may at best supplement, but not replace, a judgmental approach to surveillance.
Given the shortcomings in the data available for many countries, especially in the
emerging markets, considerable efforts to improve coverage and timeliness are
warranted. Besides macroeconomic data, emerging-market countries may need to
lay particular emphasis on better banking data, given the structure of their financial
markets, which is typically bank-dominated, while also providing detailed
information on the public-sector position. They may also need to improve market
discipline by encouraging transparency and disclosure on the part of the private
sector.30
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Table 1: Selected episodes of financial instability 1970-98
Date Event Main feature
1970 US Penn Central
Bankruptcy
Collapse of market liquidity and
issuance
1973 UK secondary  banking Bank failures following loan losses
1974 Herstatt (Germany) Bank failure following trading losses
1982 Ldc debt crisis Bank failures following loan losses
1984 Continental Illinois (US) Bank failure following loan losses
1985 Canadian Regional Banks Bank failures following loan losses
1986 FRN market Collapse of market liquidity and
issuance
1986 US thrifts Bank failures following loan losses
1987 Stock market crash Price volatility after shift in
expectations




Bank failures following loan losses
1990 Swedish commercial paper Collapse of market liquidity and
issuance
1990-1 Norwegian banking crisis Bank failures following loan losses
1991-2 Finnish banking crisis Bank failures following loan losses
1991-2 Swedish banking crisis Bank failures following loan losses
1992-6 Japanese banking crisis Bank failures following loan losses
1992 ECU bond market collapse Collapse of market liquidity and
issuance
1992-3 ERM crisis Price volatility after shift in
expectations
1994 Bond market reversal Price volatility after shift in
expectations
1995 Mexican crisis Price volatility after shift in
expectations
1997 Asian crisis Price volatility following shift in
expectations and bank failures
following loan losses.
1998 Russian default and LTCM Collapse of market liquidity and
issuance
For detailed accounts see Davis (1994, 1995b, 1995c, 1999)34












































































































































































Table 3: Data needs by type and the sign of the leading indicator effect
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Note: the signs indicate the typical direction of change of the variable in advance of financial instability. Where two signs are given, these indicate long and short-term
effects, eg real interest rates are often low during a boom and bubble, but increase when monetary policy is tightened before or during the crisis.37
Table 4: Data availability for Thailand in June 1997
Sources: IMF (1997), BIS (1997a and b)
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